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Abstract—In this paper, we enunciate the theorem of secrecy
in tagged protocols using the theory of witness-functions and
we run a formal analysis on a new tagged version of the
Needham-Schroeder public-key protocol using this theorem. We
discuss the significance of tagging in securing cryptographic
protocols as well.
Index Terms—cryptographic protocols, intruder, secrecy, secu-
rity, tag, unification, witness-function.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, a new category of analytic functions, called
witness-functions, has been put forward to analyze crypto-
graphic protocols for secrecy [1]–[4]. These functions assign
to every single atomic message involved in the protocol a
reasonable level of security. An analysis with a witness-
function is the process that tries to make sure that this level
of security never goes down between any two consecutive
steps, a receiving step and a sending one, from the very first
appearance of the atomic message in the protocol until its final
destination. This is obviously sufficient to guarantee that any
secret will never fall into the hands of an unauthorized agent
including an evil intruder. In that case, the protocol is said to be
increasing. Certainly, the witness-functions are able to analyze
any protocol. However, we notice that they present interesting
features when they are used on tagged protocols. In fact, the
theorem of analysis acquires a reduced and elegant form and
the analysis becomes much quicker. This is because there is
a subtle relationship between tagging, on the one hand, and a
witness-function definition, on the other hand. In this paper,
1This paper has been accepted at the 31st Annual IEEE Canadian Confer-
ence on Electrical and Computer Engineering (CCECE 2018). Que´bec City,
Canada. May 13–16, 2018.
we discuss these aspects and we analyze a tagged protocol
with a witness-function. The paper is organized as follows. In
section II, we recall the theory of witness-functions. In section
III, we give an overview on tagged protocol. In section IV, we
enunciate the theorem of secrecy in tagged protocols using
witness-functions. In section V, we propose a tagged version
of the Needham-Schroeder public-key protocol and we analyze
it with that theorem. In section VI, we discuss some interesting
related works dealing with tagged protocols and we compare
them to our approach. In section VII, we conclude.
II. THE THEORY OF WITNESS-FUNCTIONS
The theory of witness-functions has been proposed by
Fattahi et al. [1]–[4] to statically verify cryptographic protocols
for secrecy. A witness-function is an analytic function that
attributes a safe level of security to every atomic message in
the protocol and the analysis using a witness-function closely
follows the growth of this value during the lifecycle of this
atom. In this section, we recall the fundaments of this theory.
Please notice that we will give the meaning of every notation
we use in a natural language as soon as it shows up first.
A. Context of verification
A protocol analysis using the witness-functions runs in a
role-based specification [5], [6] under the hypotheses of Dolev-
Yao [7]. In this paper, we assume that a protocol is always
analyzed under the perfect encryption assumption which means
that we do not deal with flaws caused by the cryptographic sys-
tem in use or the implementation of cryptographic primitives.
Equally, we suppose that there is no special equational theory
and all secrets, keys and other names are atomic.
B. Reliable function
Definition 1: (Well-formed Function) Let F be a function.
F is well-formed iff: ∀M,M1,M2 ⊆M, ∀α ∈ A(M):
F (α, {α}) = ⊥
F (α,M1 ∪M2) = F (α,M1) ⊓ F (α,M2)
F (α,M) = ⊤, if α /∈ A(M)
A well-formed function F should assign the infimum level
of security (i.e. ⊥) to an atomic message α that shows up in
clear (not encrypted) in a setM of messages. This is obviously
to express that anybody who knows M inevitably knows α.
It assigns to an atomic message in the union of two sets of
messages the minimum of the two levels (i.e. ⊓) assigned in
each set alone. It assigns the supremum (i.e. ⊤) to an atomic
message α that does not even appear in M . This is to express
the fact that nobody is able to know α when he knowsM . We
note by A(M) the atomic messages of M .
Definition 2: (Full-invariant-by-intruder Function) Let F
be a function. F is full-invariant-by-intruder iff: ∀M ⊆
M,m ∈ M, α ∈ A(m):
M |= m⇒ (F (α,m) ⊒ F (α,M)) ∨ (pK(I)q ⊒ pαq).
A full-invariant-by-intruder function F should resist against
any malicious tentative to lower the level of security by an
intruder once F assigns to an atomic message α a level of
security in a set of messagesM . That is to say that the intruder
can never infer (i.e. |=) from this set M any other message
m in which this level may be lower than the one given in M
(i.e. F (α,m) 6⊒ F (α,M)), exception made when the intruder
is explicitly authorized to know α (i.e. pK(I)q ⊒ pαq). We
say that a function F is reliable when it is well-formed and
full-invariant-by-intruder.
Definition 3: (F -Increasing Protocol) Let F be a function
and p be a protocol. p is F -increasing iff: ∀R.r, ∀σ, ∀α ∈
A(r+), we have: F (α, r+σ) ⊒ pαq ⊓ F (α,R−σ)
An F -increasing protocol is a protocol that constantly
pumps traces (substituted generalized roles in a role-based
specification) with atomic messages α that always have a
security level, calculated by F , higher (i.e. ⊒) upon a sending
step (i.e. in the generalized role r+σ, the sign + denotes a
sending operation and σ a substitution corresponding to a
possible execution of the protocol) than the one calculated
by the same function in the messages received in the latest
receiving step (i.e. in the generalized role R−σ, the sign −
denotes a receiving operation), or higher than the level of
security of α obtained directly from within the context of
verification (i.e. pαq), if it is available.
Theorem 1: (Secrecy in Increasing Protocols) Let F be a
reliable function and p be an F -increasing protocol.
p is correct for secrecy.
Theorem 1 brings up a very important result. It establishes
that a protocol is correct for secrecy if it could be demonstrated
increasing using a reliable function F . The sketch of the proof
is quite straightforward. That is, if the attacker manages to
discover an initially protected secret α (get it in clear) then its
security level calculated by F should be the infimum seeing as
F is well-formed. This scenario cannot be rooted in the rules
of the protocol seeing as this latter is F -increasing and its rules
constantly raise the level of security of α. This scenario could
not happen either if the intruder uses his capabilities seeing
as F is full-invariant-by-intruder and then the intruder could
not forge any message in which the security level of α may
decline. Hence, this scenario could simply never happen and
the secret could never be disclosed. The complete formal proof
could be found in [8].
C. Construction of Reliable Function
Here we give one constructive way to build a reliable
function. Let’s consider the function F defined as follows:
Definition 4: (Reliable Function)
1. F (α, {α}) = ⊥
2. F (α,M1 ∪M2) = F (α,M1) ⊓ F (α,M2)
3. F (α,M) = ⊤, if α /∈ A(M)
4. F (α,m1.m2) = F (α, {m1,m2})
5. F (α, {m}k) = F (α, {m}), if pk
−1
q 6⊒ pαq
6. F (α, {m}k) = pk
−1
q ⊓ ID(m), if pk−1q ⊒ pαq
The first three steps 1., 2. and 3. directly grant the function F
the property of being well-formed. The step 4. deconcatenates
a message m1.m2 into two messages m1 and m2 and F
returns the same level of security as in the set {m1,m2}.
That is because an intruder, although he can deconcatenate
any message m1.m2, he cannot infer about α in m1.m2 more
than he could infer about it in each of m1 or m2 separately.
The step 5. ignores encryption with an outer weak key (i.e.
pk−1q 6⊒ pαq) and looks for a deeper strong key. That is
because if α is encrypted with a weak key, it can fall into the
hands of an unauthorized agent. The step 6. makes sure that α
is encrypted with a strong key k (i.e. pk−1q ⊒ pαq meaning
the reverse key k−1 must be known only by a part of agents
who are authorized to know α in the context) and F returns the
set of agent identities who know the reverse key (i.e. pk−1q) as
well as the identity of all the neighbors of α in m (i.e. ID(m)).
The step 6. transforms F into a full-invariant-by-intruder
function. In fact, an unauthorized intruder who attempts to
mislead F should obtain the key k−1 beforehand. Hence, his
knowledge must include k−1 (i.e. pK(I)q ⊒ pk−1q). Since
the key k−1 is such that pk−1q ⊒ pαq then the knowledge of
the intruder must satisfy pK(I)q ⊒ pαq as well owing to the
transitivity of the comparator ”⊒”. This is contradictory to the
fact that the intruder is unauthorized to know α.
Example 1: Let us have the following context of veri-
fication: pαq = {A,B, S}; m = {{C.{α.D}kas}kab}kac ;
k−1ac = kac, k
−1
ab = kab, k
−1
as = kas; pkacq = {A,C}, pkasq =
{A,S}, pkabq = {A,B}. We have:
F (α,m) = F (α, {C.{α.D}kas}kab) = {C,D}∪pk
−1
ab q =
{C,D} ∪ {A,B} = {A,B,C,D}.
Please notice that the outermost encryption by kac has been
ignored by F because it is a weak key since the agent C is not
authorized to know α in the context (i.e. pαq = {A,B, S}).
This case falls into the step 5.
Other reliable functions could be found in [2], [4]. In the
rest of this paper, we will only use the function defined in this
subsection and we refer to it by F .
D. Witness-functions to reduce the impact of variables
The function F as defined above may be suitable to assign
security level for atomic messages but in ground terms only.
Nevertheless, when we analyze a protocol, messages are not
necessarily ground and may contain variables. To cope with
this situation, the idea is to use the derivative function F ′
of F that operates like F but after eliminating variables
from the neighborhood of α (e.g. F ′(α, {α.X.B}kcd) =
F (α, {α.B}kcd) = {B,C,D}). Although the derivative func-
tion remains well-formed and full-invariant-by-intruder, it may
lose its quality as a function and may return multiple and
contradictory values for the same trace generated by a sub-
stitution in the generalized roles. For example, if the trace
is {α.A.B}kcd that could be produced by substitution in two
generalized roles {α.X.B}kcd and {α.Y }kcd , the function F
′
assigns to α the level of security {B,C,D} when the trace
originates from the first generalized role, and the level of
security {C,D} if the trace originates from the second one. To
overcome this incoherence, we define the witness-functions.
Definition 5: [Witness-Function]
Wp,F (α,mσ) = ⊓
{(m′,σ′)∈M˜Gp⊗Γ|m
′σ′=mσ}
F ′(α,m′σ′)
A witness-functionWp,F calculates the level of security of
an atomic message α in a trace mσ by using F ′ applied to all
the possible origins m′ in the messages M˜p generated by the
generalized roles and returns the minimum, which is obviously
a single value. Nevertheless, a witness-function could not be
used as is to analyze a protocol since the analysis runs statically
on the generalized roles not on the traces (i.e. mσ) which are
dynamic entities. For that, we bound a witness-function by two
static bounds as follows.
Lemma 1: [binding a witness-function]
F ′(α,m) ⊒ Wp,F (α,mσ) ⊒ ⊓
{(m′,σ′)∈M˜Gp⊗Γ|m
′σ′=mσ′}
F ′(α,m′σ′)
The upper-bound F ′(α,m) returns a minimal set of identi-
ties fromm after removing all variables inm. The lower-bound
⊓
{(m′,σ′)∈M˜Gp⊗Γ|m
′σ′=mσ′}
F ′(α,m′σ′) returns all the identities gathered
from all the messages that could be unified with m. The
witness-function returns certain identities in between which
are known only when the protocol is executed from the actual
origins of the trace only. The inequality is quite intuitive since
m is a guaranteed origin of the trace mσ and the actual origins
of the trace mσ is a subset of the messages that are unifiable
with m. The two bounds are obviously statically computable.
Theorem 2: [Decision Procedure for Secrecy with a
Witness-Function] Let p be a protocol. LetWp,F be a witness-
function. p is correct for secrecy if: ∀R.r ∈ RG(p), ∀α ∈
A(r+) we have:
⊓
{(m′,σ′)∈M˜Gp⊗Γ|m
′σ′=r+σ′}
F ′(α,m′σ′) ⊒ pαq ⊓ F ′(α,R−)
Theorem 2 establishes a decision procedure for secrecy
using the bounds a witness-function. When a message is sent
(i.e. r+), it is analyzed largely with the lower-bound of a
witness-function. When a message is received (i.e R−), it is
analyzed strictly with the upper-bound of a witness-function.
Any dishonest identity ambushed by the lower-bound that is
not returned by the upper-bound will be interpreted as an
intrusion. The protocol is then decided not increasing and the
analysis halts with a failure flag. Theorem 2 is a direct result of
Theorem 1 and Lemma 1. Please notice that Theorem 2 does
not imply the witness-function itself (i.e. Wp,F ). It involves
its bounds only.
III. TAGGED PROTOCOLS
A tag is any subtlety or any syntactic annotation put inside
a message to differentiate it from another message. A tagged
protocol is a protocol such that every message received by
any agent has a unique and regular origin. That implies that
every single message (an encryption pattern) containing a
variable (i.e. something that the receiver does not know) is
distinguishable from any other message (any other encryption
pattern) and does not unify with any message other than
the regular message that the receiver is expecting to get
through the network from the right agent. Tagging a protocol
could be reached by inserting an identity beside some atom
in the message. For example, if an agent A receives the
message {α.B.X}kab where the variable X is supposed to
be a nonce Nb sent by a regular agent B and the protocol
generates also the message {α.B.C}kab , we can change the
message {α.B.X}kab in the definition of the protocol by
{A.α.B.X}kab in the new tagged version of the protocol and
hence the message {α.B.C}kab will not unify with it. All the
same, a signature could be an efficient tag, too. For example,
we can change the message {α.B.X}kab in the definition of
the protocol by {{α}k−1
b
.B.X}kab in the new tagged version
of the protocol to prevent {α.B.C}kab from unifying with it.
Tagging could be also reached by inserting an ordinal number
into an encrypted message or inserting a string describing
the type of certain components inside. In general, tagging
prevents man-in-the-middle attacks from happening by offering
the receiver the way to distinguish a regular message from an
irregular one.
IV. THEOREM FOR SECRECY IN TAGGED PROTOCOLS
As a matter of fact, when a protocol is tagged (all its
messages are distinguishable one from another), it becomes
nonsense talking about message that overlap (unifiable).
This has a direct impact on the reduction of Theorem 2. In
fact, the expression ⊓
{(m′,σ′)∈M˜Gp⊗Γ|m
′σ′=r+σ′}
F ′(α,m′σ′) in Theorem
2 will be reduced to F ′(α, r+). That is, the lower-bound
⊓
{(m′,σ′)∈M˜Gp⊗Γ|m
′σ′=r+σ′}
F ′(α,m′σ′) means F ′ applied to all the
patterns in the generalized roles that are unifiable with the
message r+ and its goal is to ambush dishonest identities that
could be inserted in the neighborhood of an analyzed atomic
message α. Nevertheless, this could never happen when the
protocol is tagged. A tagged protocol creates in fact a series
of from regular to regular data flow in which the intruder is
hopeless to launch any man-in-the-middle attack. In that case,
if the protocol happens to be incorrect, that will definitely be
because it is not increasing by construction because of a bad
reasoning on the knowledge of every agent and without any
intervention from the intruder. This brings us to the following
theorem.
p= 〈1, A −→ B : {Na.A.B}kb 〉
〈2, B −→ A : {A.B.Na}ka .{B.A.Nb}ka 〉
〈3, A −→ B : {Nb.B.A.Na}kb 〉.
TABLE I
A TAGGED VERSION OF THE NEEDHAM-SCHROEDER PROTOCOL
Theorem 3: [Theorem of Secrecy for Tagged Protocols] Let
p be a tagged protocol. Let Wp,F be a witness- function. p is
correct for secrecy if: ∀R.r ∈ RG(p), ∀α ∈ A(r
+) we have:
F ′(α, r+) ⊒ pαq ⊓ F ′(α,R−)
Theorem 3 enables tagged protocols to use simply the
derivative function F ′ on both the received generalized role
and the sent one to determine whether or not the tagged
protocol is increasing, with no need to perform any further
unifications. It is worth mentioning that verifying whether or
not a protocol is tagged is an easy task that is carried out only
once before analyzing the protocol. It is equally worth noticing
that Theorem 3 sets just sufficient conditions for the tagged
protocol correctness regarding secrecy, which conditions are
not inevitably necessary since the problem of secrecy remains
undecidable in general. In the rest of the paper, we will refer
to Theorem 3 by the acronym TSTP.
V. FORMAL ANALYSIS OF A TAGGED VERSION OF THE
NEEDHAM-SCHROEDER PUBLIC-KEY PROTOCOL
In this section, we propose our new tagged version of the
Needham-Schroeder public-key protocol (different from the
NSL protocol) and we analyze it with Theorem 3 (TSTP) for
secrecy. This version is given in Table I.
A. Context setting
The generalized roles of p are defined by RG(p) =
{AG ,BG} where:
AG = i.1 A −→ I(B) : {N
i
a.A.B}kb
i.2 I(B) −→ A : {A.B.N ia}ka .{B.A.X}ka
i.3 A −→ I(B) : {X.B.A.N ia}kb
BG = j.1 I(A) −→ B : {Y.A.B}kb
j.2 B −→ I(A) : {A.B.Y }ka .{B.A.N
j
b }ka
j.3 I(A) −→ B : {N jb .B.A.Y }kb
Initial knowledge :
pAq = ⊥; pBq = ⊥; (i.e. two public identities)
pNaq = {A,B} (i.e. secret shared between A and B);
pNbq = {A,B} (i.e. secret shared between A and B);
pk−1a q = {A}; (i.e. private key of A)
pk−1b q = {B}; (i.e. private key of B)
pkaq = ⊥; (i.e. public key of A)
pkbq = ⊥; (i.e. public key of B)
(L,⊒,⊔,⊓,⊥,⊤) = (2I ,⊆,∩,∪, I, ∅); (i.e. security lattice)
I = {I,A,B}; (i.e. intruder and regular agents present on the net)
Xp = {X,Y } is the set of variables. F is the function given by
Definition 4 and F ′ is its derivative form.
B. Tagging verification
Before we dive into the analysis, let us make sure that this
protocol is a tagged one. At the first sight, an attentive eye should
remark that the protocol is tagged by the position of the identities
in its messages. In fact, the encrypted message {Na.A.B}kb is the
only one that contains the identity of the receiver (i.e. B) at the
last position. The encrypted message {A.B.Na}ka is the only one
that contains the identity of the receiver (i.e. A) at the first position
and the identity of the sender (i.e. B) at the second position. The
encrypted message {B.A.Nb}ka is the only one that contains the
identity of the receiver (i.e. A) at the second position and the identity
of the sender (i.e. B) at the first position. Finally, the encrypted
message {Nb.B.A.Na}kb is the only one that contains the identity
of the receiver (i.e. B) followed by the identity of the sender (i.e. A)
that must show up in the middle of the message only. This makes
all the encryptions distinguishable one from another from a receiver
point of view. More rigorously, according to the generalized roles
AG , the agent A is a receiver in the step i.2. The first message
he receives is {A.B.N ia}ka which is the regular message expected
by B. The other message is {B.A.X}ka which unifies only with
{B.A.N ib}ka which is the regular message that A is expecting.
According to the generalized roles BG , the agent B is a receiver
in two steps.
1) In the step j.1 : B receives {Y.A.B}kb . This message unifies
only with the message {N ia.A.B}kb , which is the regular
message that B is expecting;
2) In the step j.3 : B receives {N jb .B.A.Y }kb . This message
unifies only with {X.B.A.N ia}kb . Upon replacing X by N
j
b
and Y by N ia, the received message becomes {N
j
b .B.A.N
i
a}kb ,
which is the regular message that B is expecting.
Therefore, this protocol is a tagged one and Theorem TSTP
applies.
C. Analyzing the generalized role of A
As defined in the generalized role AG , an agent A may participate
in two receiving-sending steps. In the first step, he receives nothing
and sends the message {N ia.A.B}kb . In the subsequent step, he re-
ceives the message {A.B.N ia}ka .{B.A.X}ka and sends the message
{X.B.A.N ia}kb . This is represented by the following two rules.
S
1
A :

{N ia.A.B}kb
S
2
A :
{A.B.N ia}ka .{B.A.X}ka
{X.B.A.N ia}kb
1) Analyzing exchanged messages in S1A:
1- For N ia:
a- On sending: r+
S1
A
= {N ia.A.B}kb
F ′(N ia, r
+
S1
A
) = F ′(N ia, {N
i
a.A.B}kb)
{No variable in the neighborhood of N ia to be removed by derivation}
= F (N ia, {N
i
a.A.B}kb)
{Definition 4}
= {A,B} ∪ pk−1b q
{Since pk−1b q = {B}}
= {A,B} ∪ {B}
= {A,B} (1.1)
b- On receiving: R−
Si
= ∅
F ′(N ia, R
−
S1
A
) = F ′(N ia, ∅)
{No variable in the neighborhood of N ia to be removed by derivation}
= F (N ia, ∅)
{Definition 4}
= ⊤ (1.2)
2- Accordance with Theorem TSTP:
From (1.2) and since pNaq = {A,B}, we have:
pN iaq ⊓ F
′(N ia, R
−
S1
A
) = {A,B} ⊓ ⊤ = {A,B} (1.3)
From (1.1) and (1.3), we have :
F ′(N ia, r
+
S1
A
) ⊒ pN iaq ⊓ F
′(N ia, R
−
S1
A
) (1.4)
From (1.4), S1A respects Theorem TSTP. (I)
2) Analyzing exchanged messages in S2A:
1- For N ia:
a- On sending: r+
S2
A
= {X.B.A.N ia}kb
F ′(N ia, r
+
S2
A
) = F ′(N ia, {X.B.A.N
i
a}kb)
{The variable X is removed by derivation}
= F (N ia, {B.A.N
i
a}kb)
{Definition 4}
= {A,B} ∪ pk−1b q
{Since pk−1b q = {B}}
= {A,B} ∪ {B}
= {A,B} (2.1)
b- On receiving: R−
S2
A
= {A.B.N ia}ka .{B.A.X}ka
F ′(N ia, R
−
S2
A
) = F ′(N ia, {A.B.N
i
a}ka .{B.A.X}ka )
{The variable X is removed by derivation}
= F (N ia, {A.B.N
i
a}ka .{B.A}ka )
{Definition 4 and F is well-formed}
= F (N ia, {A.B.N
i
a}ka) ⊓ F (N
i
a, {B.A}ka)
{F is well-formed}
= F (N ia, {A.B.N
i
a}ka) ⊓ ⊤
{Security lattice property}
= F (N ia, {A.B.N
i
a}ka)
{Definition 4}
= {A,B} ∪ pk−1a q
{Since pk−1a q = {A}}
= {A,B} ∪ {A}
= {A,B} (2.2)
2- For X:
c- On sending: r+
S2
A
= {X.B.A.N ia}kb
F ′(X, r+
S2
A
) = F ′(X, {X.B.A.N ia}kb)
{No variable in the neighborhood of X to be removed by derivation}
= F (X, {X.B.A.N ia}kb)
{Definition 4}
= {A,B} ∪ pk−1b q
{Since pk−1b q = {B}}
= {A,B} ∪ {B}
= {A,B} (2.3)
d- On receiving: R−
S2
A
= {A.B.N ia}ka .{B.A.X}ka
F ′(X,R−
S2
A
) = F ′(X, {A.B.N ia}ka .{B.A.X}ka )
{No variable in the neighborhood of X to be removed by derivation}
= F (X, {A.B.N ia}ka .{B.A.X}ka )
{Definition 4 and F is well-formed}
= F (X, {A.B.N ia}ka) ⊓ F (X, {B.A.X}ka)
{F is well-formed}
= ⊤ ⊓ F (X, {B.A.X}ka)
{Security lattice property}
= F (X, {B.A.X}ka)
{Definition 4}
= {A,B} ∪ pk−1a q
{Since pk−1a q = {A}}
= {A,B} ∪ {A}
= {A,B} (2.4)
3- Accordance with Theorem TSTP:
From (2.1), (2.2), we have directly:
F
′(N ia, r
+
S2
A
) ⊒ pN iaq ⊓ F
′(N ia, R
−
S2
A
) (2.5)
From (2.3) and (2.4), we have directly:
F
′(X, r+
S2
A
) ⊒ pXq ⊓ F ′(X,R−
S2
A
) (2.6)
From (2.5) and (2.6), S2A respects Theorem TSTP. (II)
D. Analyzing the generalized role of B
As defined in the generalized role BG , an agent B may participate
in just one receiving-sending step in which he receives the message
{Y.A.B}kb and sends the message {A.B.Y }ka .{B.A.N
j
b }ka . This
is represented by the following rule.
SB :
{Y.A.B}kb
{A.B.Y }ka .{B.A.N
j
b }ka
1) Analyzing exchanged messages in SB:
1- For N
j
b :
a- On sending: r+SB = {A.B.Y }ka .{B.A.N
j
b }ka
F ′(N jb , r
+
SB
) = F ′(N jb , {A.B.Y }ka .{B.A.N
j
b }ka)
{The variable Y is removed by derivation}
= F (N jb , {A.B}ka .{B.A.N
j
b }ka)
{Definition 4 and F is well-formed}
= F (N jb , {A.B}ka) ⊓ F (N
j
b , {B.A.N
j
b }ka)
{Definition 4 and F is well-formed}
= F (N jb , {A.B}ka) ⊓ F (N
j
b , {B.A.N
j
b }ka)
{F is well-formed}
= ⊤⊓ F (N jb , {B.A.N
j
b }ka)
{Security lattice property}
= F (N jb , {B.A.N
j
b }ka)
{Definition 4}
= {A,B} ∪ pk−1a q
{Since pk−1a q = {A}}
= {A,B} ∪ {A}
= {A,B} (3.1)
b- On receiving: R−SB = {Y.A.B}kb
F ′(N jb , R
−
SB
) = F ′(N jb , {Y.A.B}kb)
{The variable Y is removed by derivation}
= F (N jb , {A.B}kb)
{F is well-formed}
= ⊤ (3.2)
2- For Y :
a- On sending: r+SB = {A.B.Y }ka .{B.A.N
j
b }ka
F ′(Y, r+SB ) = F
′(Y, {A.B.Y }ka .{B.A.N
j
b }ka)
{No variable in the neighborhood of Y to be removed by derivation}
= F (Y, {A.B.Y }ka .{B.A.N
j
b }ka)
{Definition 4 and F is well-formed}
= F (Y, {A.B.Y }ka) ⊓ F (Y, {B.A.N
j
b }ka)
{F is well-formed}
= F (Y, {A.B.Y }ka) ⊓ ⊤
{Security lattice property}
= F (Y, {A.B.Y }ka)
{Definition 4}
= {A,B} ∪ pk−1a q
{Since pk−1a q = {A}}
= {A,B} ∪ {A}
= {A,B} (3.3)
b- On receiving: R−SB = {Y.A.B}kb
F ′(Y,R−SB ) = F
′(Y, {Y.A.B}kb)
{No variable in the neighborhood of Y to be removed by derivation}
= F (Y, {Y.A.B}kb)
{Definition 4}
= {A,B} ∪ pk−1b q
{Since pk−1b q = {B}}
= {A,B} ∪ {B}
= {A,B} (3.4)
3- Accordance with Theorem TSTP:
From (3.1), (3.2) and since pNbq = {A,B} we have:
F
′(N jb , r
+
SB
) ⊒ pN jb q ⊓ F
′(N jb , R
−
SB
) (3.5)
From (3.3) and (3.4), we have directly:
F
′(Y, r+SB ) ⊒ pY q ⊓ F
′(Y,R−SA) (3.6)
From (3.5) and (3.6), SB respects Theorem TSTP. (III)
VI. COMPARISON WITH RELATED WORKS
From (I), (II) and (II), we deduce that the tagged version
of the Needham-Schroeder public-key protocol given in Table
I fully respects Theorem TSTP. Hence, we conclude that it
is correct for secrecy. In fact, tagging constitutes an efficient
way to create well-structured protocols that help avoid mis-
interpretation of received messages and a regular agent is
always assured that he is receiving messages from the right
regular agent. A tagged protocol is a good candidate for an
analysis by witness-functions that can verify it quickly owing
to the simplified theorem we have exhibited so far. By the
same token, the authors in [9] add a tag for each type by
adding an explicit name in every message generated by the
protocol. For instance, they use the notation (nonce, N ) to
indicate that the value N is supposed to be a nonce. This
extra information is in fact added by honest agents to precise
the intended type of the message and the receiver uses it to
recognize the message. This way, tags ensure that any message
having originally a given type will not be interpreted as having
another type which prevents any possible type-flaw attack.
In [10], tagging schemes are used for a decidability proof
purpose. The tag is represented as a fresh number that marks
all encrypted sub-terms in the protocol. As a result, tagging
prevents the unification of different encrypted sub-terms which
transforms an undecidable general problem to a decidable
particular one even with an infinite number of nonces. In
[11], tagging allows to change the inherent non-termination
property caused by inference rules. An approach based on Horn
clauses [12] is adopted in which attacker abilities and protocol
rules are translated into Horn clauses, then the algorithm infers
progressively new clauses by resolution. After some resolution
steps, the authors show that it is possible to generate an
infinite number of sessions which may lead to non-termination.
However, after adding a tag on each use of a cryptographic
primitive, every encrypted message becomes distinguishable
from others, obviously owing to the tag. To practically high-
light the effect of tagging, they apply their approach on
untagged protocols whose their resolution algorithm does not
terminate (i.e. the Needham–Schroeder shared-key protocol,
the Woo-Lam shared key protocol, etc.). Then, they show that
after tagging the protocol, messages become unambiguously
identified and the infinite loop observed before never happens
again. Therefore, the algorithm terminates. In [13], Arapinis et
al. give a scheme to transform a secure protocol for a single
session, which is a decidable problem, to a secure one for an
unbounded number of sessions using tagging. In [14], Cortier
et al. show that if a protocol running alone is secure, it remains
secure even if it runs simultaneously with other protocols if
we carefully add a tag to every encryption in such a way that
we can differentiate between all the protocols by adding the
name of the protocol for example. Similarly, Bauer et al. [15]
show that if a protocol is correct for secrecy with a probability
higher than some threshold, a protocol composition remains
correct for secrecy provided that protocol messages are tagged.
Our work in this paper is one of these efforts with the clear
advantage that our proposed theorem helps to prove secrecy
statically with no need to go through dynamic complexities.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we put forward a new theorem to prove
secrecy inside tagged protocols using witness-functions. Then,
we run a detailed analysis on a tagged version of the Needham-
Schroeder public-key protocol. Finally, we discussed some
works pinpointing multiple advantages of protocol tagging.
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